Chapter 12
“There is nothing for you to do.” Pierra told Minna as the Advocate closed her book. “I have practiced law here my entire life. What can you hope to accomplish in two weeks?”
Minna paced around her bed.
“Waiting and doing nothing is not in her nature,” Jeffers told Pierra.
“There really is nothing you can do,” Pierra said. “In fact, the less you do, the better. If you get yourself into any other trouble, it will make my job all the more difficult. So, I really must advise you to do nothing. Most importantly, do not antagonize Lady Deonta further. It will not improve your chances of walking out of here.”
“You want me to pretend I agree with this nonsense?”
“Save your pride for when you are safe,” Pierra answered. “Once you are back in Malikii, you can rant all you want at the foolishness of our town and you can do so in complete safety — far from here.”
The passing days found Minna approving less and less of the mercenary way Pierra pursued the case against Justice and Will. However, Pierra had something both Minna and Jeffers lacked—a thorough knowledge of K’non law.
“I will do my best,” said Minna. “Perhaps I can find something to do to pass the time.”
“Do you practice an instrument? Or is there any book from the library that would interest you?”
Minna simply waved her hand, dismissing the Advocate.
Pierra added, “Remember, I will hear the opinion of the Council today whether we will be able to use the defense of madness, charm, or possession.” Minna nodded her acknowledgement, then Pierra went about her business.
“She is trying to help,” said Jeffers after the door closed. “She has a job to do. She doesn’t need to the distraction of dealing with the same issues that interest us. She is looking for the best argument that will keep Zin alive, and thinks that we might have given it to her. She has no reason to care whether it is true or false, only whether it will work.”
Minna shook her head. “People should be concerned with the truth.”
“Sometimes, truth is a luxury that comes at too high a price,” Jeffers said.
Minna gave a sigh of frustration. “Truth is the only value there is. What use is it to save a life if you deny it that makes it worth while?”
“Truth is one value among many. A good lie can have value. If orcs come to you and ask where you have hidden your family, and you can save them with a lie, would you not sacrifice truth to save the lives of your family?”
“Perhaps,” Minna said reluctantly. “Do you care so little for the truth?”
“The truth is one thing among many that I care about,” Jeffers answered. “You may not have known it, but you have already given the Laurellan method of measuring value. Each value has a weight to be put on a scale. Truth has a great weight. But, if you put a sufficient number of larger concerns up against it, they can outweigh the value of truth.”
As Jeffers talked, he started to move slowly around the room. Minna climbed onto the bed and folded her legs underneath her to get out of his way. “It is the Gatian way to think of values like beliefs. Beliefs are true or false. It is the Laureallan way to treat values like desires. Desires have weight that must be balanced one against the other.”
“Is there really any difference?” Minna asked.
Jeffers answered. “Let us assume that, over time, peoples’ beliefs narrow in on the truth. The closer they agree with the truth, the closer they will agree with each other. Wherever there is disagreement between beliefs, even if they are beliefs of different people, there is incoherence. Coherence brings agreement, and agreement between two people on the same subject means that they both believe the same thing.”
“That, to me, sounds too obvious to be worth stating,” Minna answered. “Why do I feel that, if I agree with you, I’ll be stepping into a trap?”
Jeffers began to pace more quickly, and his gestures became animated. Minna smiled at this. Whenever Jeffers got into a discussion like this, he acted very much like a child with his favorite toy — unless he was around people he did not trust.
“If values are to be taken as beliefs and not desires, then, as the values of different people form greater coherence, people will come to value the same thing.”
“Continue,” Minna said with a wave of her hand, no longer caring to commit herself to anything Jeffers might say out of fear that she would have to retract it later.
“Therefore,” Jeffers said, pointing a finger at the sky. Minna leaned forward to get a better look at the trap she would have stepped in if she had followed Jeffers along this trail of reasoning, “as desires between different agents cohere, as they come to value the same things, we can expect greater competition for things of value. More and more people want it as they become more and more alike in what they like—in perceiving things as having value.”
“That seems to be true,” Minna said, willing to express a qualified acceptance of a proposition that seemed to work against Jeffers’ thesis more than for it.
Jeffers continued, “So, what will things be like when everybody has agreed on these truths; everybody is demanding these things that have value? Things that do not have value are left discarded. Into this world we introduce a single person whose values are ‘incoherent’ with those of others. He wants what nobody else wants, and he cares not a lick for what everybody else is fighting for. It seems he is going to be pretty well off.”
“He will not be well off,” Minna asserted. “His desires are perversions, and the things he seeks have no real value. He is losing out on real value in order to fulfill his sick, distorted tastes.”
Jeffers bit his lip and scowled at her. “No, it does not make sense to call them perversions. Think about a whole planet full of deer and antelope playing, chewing on the grass, enjoying the sunshine. It turns out that they all like the same thing. They all eat the same type of grass. They all fight over the same mates. Now, a fawn is born into this herd that likes the grass that nobody else is eating, and who seeks to mate with the deer that none of the others will mate with. This deer has it easy. He eats, while others starve, and he avoids all of the fights and competition that is getting the others wounded or killed, or forcing them to suffer the absence of what the winners take for themselves. A diversity of values is a good thing.”
“Good in what sense?” Minna asked. “If diverging values is a good thing, then we should have some people value divergence, and others who hate it.”
Jeffers sighed. “I am not saying that different desires is an absolute good thing. I am saying that there are certain desires that fit well together even if — even because — they are desires for different things. Other desires don’t fit well together. All of this is perfectly consistent with the Laurellan claim that value is grounded on desire, and not on belief. Different beliefs are a problem because, if two people believe different things, at least one of them must be wrong. But people can and do desire different things without either of them being wrong.”
At this point Minna waved her hands and said, “Okay, I’m lost. Go back to where I was when I wasn’t lost and lets see if we can get back to this point again. Personally, I suspect I’m getting lost because you can’t really get to where you want to go by starting where you want to start.”
Jeffers restarted the argument. “Okay, I do not think there is any such thing as an attractive female hippopotamus. They are all particularly ugly. However, it is reasonable to believe that to most male hippos, a young female hippo is as beautiful to them as young females of my species are to me. Coherence with respect to values says that we should all value the same thing, which means that either the male hippo is perverse in finding the female hippo attractive, or I am perverse in finding female humans attractive.”
“I shouldn’t need to teach you Church doctrine, Jeffers. Each person should be attracted to the opposite member of its own race.” Minna said, “Or, at least, beings with whom they can form a fertile union.”
“But, that means we should all like different things, doesn’t it? Isn’t this just another way of saying that, what you like, doesn’t have to be the same thing as what I like? If you and I have different beliefs, at least one of us must be wrong. If you and I have different desires, then, well, that can be a good thing.”
“So, if somebody like Pierra has no interest in the truth, and pursues a line of reasoning even if she thinks it is flawed, because it might sway somebody else to her side, then that is a good thing.”
“It could be,” said Jeffers. “Sometimes, it is useful to go up to somebody and say, ‘Here is what I think. I want you to put your best effort into proving me wrong.”
“But if you persuade me, using a line of reasoning you know to be flawed, in the hopes that I will not see it and come to adopt your position, that is not what I want. I still want limits. I still do not want you to lie to me or try to trick me.”
“I don’t think that Pierra has a license to lie to the Counsel. She has her limits.”
“I’m certain that she does not fully believe that the doctrine of madness, charm, and possession apply to this case. If she is not convinced, how can she convince others?”
“At least, she has permission to try,” said Jeffers.
“Well, we will see how well she does at dinner this evening. In the mean time, I am supposed to be playing the part of the helpless victim trying to stay out of trouble while a punish of priests prepare me as a sacrifice to their god. Exactly how am I supposed to do that?”
Jeffers remained silent for a while, then smiled. “I would recommend exercise, m’Lady. It is an excellent way to relieve frustration, and you just may need all the strength you can muster before this is over.”
“What can I accomplish in so short a time?”
“More than you can accomplish by laying here,” said Jeffers. “Now, if you will excuse me, I have some projects of my own that demand my attention. I will see you this evening, downstairs.”
“This evening,” said Minna. She did not like to exercise, but that was probably all the more reason to follow Jeffers’ advice.
Pierra was late for dinner, but Jeffers and Minna ordered a large enough bowl of pasta to feed both of them and the Advocate, when she arrived. She always arrived; nobody had ever been able to think of an instance when the Advocate had missed a meal.
Once settled, Pierra gave her collar a stretch; a habit that signaled she was ready to discuss serious issues. “Deonta has final say, and she is inclined against letting us argue that Zin was charmed. Lady Terrence doesn’t like the idea either. She doesn’t think it’s really relevant and would vote for Zin’s punishment independent of what Justice might want; it serves the public good, she says. I’ve noticed, you have said very little against her.”
Pierra was looking at Minna, but Jeffers answered. “It’s hard to decide what to say. It may well do more good than harm to punish — to deter others. If that is true, then kindness dictates that we punish, as the lesser evil; albeit with a reluctance seldom evidenced by those who use this argument. What do the other three Council members say?”
“They are reluctant to vote as a block against Matron Deonta and Lady Terrence; which they will have to do if we are to win. Our arguments, I am afraid, are going to have to center on protecting them politically from offending the Matron and the Lady, not rational discourse as to the merits of our case.”
“Politics,” Minna mumbled.
“Welcome to the real world.” Pierra mumbled around a mouth full of pasta. “But they are not entirely immune to reason; a rational argument is only one part, and not the most important part, of what they need in order to vote in our favor. The others I will handle, but I will confess that I am not as good as I need to be at the rationality behind this argument. I’m particularly bad at using this weapon you call Occam’s Razor. People keep questioning me on exactly how it follows from telling a story about something without mentioning Will’s Power or Justice, that neither of these things exist.”
Minna answered, “First, it doesn’t follow from being able to tell ar story without referring to something that it doesn’t exist. Only a fool would try to argue that the fact that I can tell a lot of true stories without ever mentioning trees means that trees do not exist. What you need to show them is that you can tell a story about Zin’s actions without mentioning Will’s Power. That story compares Zin to the woodchoppers who enter Henchman Copse. We say that those who are charmed by Henchman Copse do not have access to Will’s Power, so we at least have reasonable doubt that Zin had access to Will’s Power.”
Jeffers grew one of his cold and humorless smiles. “Unfortunately, when you tell such a story, a lot of people are going to rate it by its artistic merit, and not its logic. They will base their judgment on whether the story feels right. Of course, to determine if the story feels right, they will judge it by whether it fits with what they already believe. They will reject it for feeling wrong if it does not tell them what that they were right all along. Chances are, the Counsil member will be unable to put her finger on exactly what is ‘wrong’ with the story. It just won’t sound right. But if they, then, use the oddness of the story as an argument against its conclusions, then they are begging the question.”
“I don’t think I’m following this,” the Advocate said, still chewing. “Like I said, I need to know what your proof is that these things don’t exist. Your claim that they are not needed to explain any real event is pretty weak. How do you know that they’re not needed? How can you be sure that no person can name some event for which Will’s Power or Justice might have to be part of the explanation?”
Jeffers answered, “If you insist on certainty, then you will always be disappointed. For all you know, this whole planet could be an elaborate hoax; an illusion generated by a very powerful wizard just to see how you, the only person who really exists other than this wizard, will react. Prove this is false.”
The Advocate shrugged.
“Neither can I,” said Jeffers. “Neither can I show beyond all possible doubt that nobody will ever come up with proof of the existence of Justice and Will. But that somebody might prove me wrong is no reason to believe that I am wrong. I wait for their evidence. In the mean time, I live in accordance with the best evidence I have available today.”
Jeffers paused a moment in thought, and smiled. “Then there are those who go to the other extreme. They argue that, since nothing is certain, everything is possible; and from this that everything is just as possible as everything else. Some people who say such things sound like they really believe it; but nobody can believe it and stay alive for long. What would they eat if they really believed that paper and sand can give them the same nutrition as fruit and meat? How would they move about if they believed that any direction out of a building must be considered as good or valid as any other?”
“Are you certain that nothing is certain?” Pierra asked with a smile.
“As your very question points out, even that can be thrown into doubt,” Jeffers said. “Reason can not give us certainty, and only a fool demands it. But reason can show us answer is best; and only a fool insists that all answers are equal. I can not say for certain that ‘Will’s Power’ and ‘Justice’ do not exist, but reason recommends against believing in their existence.”
“That reminds me,” the Advocate said, waiving a fork at Minna. “Lady Stryklia, one of the elders and a member of the council, wants to speak with you personally, Varlet Minna. I’ve been asked to forward an invitation for afternoon tea tomorrow.”
“What about?”
“I don’t know. Maybe she wants to find out what you really think. Maybe she wants to talk you out of what you are doing. Actually, I’ve been begging these people to speak with you themselves rather than have me relay arguments I do not fully understand; but they say they want to leave council business for when they are sitting in council, though they tend to forget this rule often enough as the whim strikes them.”
Minna sighed, “I would be happy to talk to her. It beats sitting around here all day with nothing to do.”
“As a warning, what we were talking about when she grew frustrated and made this invitation is the fact that justice is a projection of our own desire for retribution, not a value intrinsic to punishment.”
“I never mentioned projection,” Minna protested.
“I thought. . .” stammered the advocate.
Minna continued, “We observe that we are attracted to certain ends, that is all. We do not perceive the value in the object; that is just a theory used to explain our attraction. Of the two theories; that we are pulled to value inherent intrinsic to it, or pushed by our own desires, neither can claim a presumption over the other. We can not perceive the forces that pull or push us to certain ends, any more than we can perceive gravity or whatever it is that pulls a magnet. We only see their effects.”
Pierra returned to searching her scattered notes, scanning one crumpled paper after another, shoving some into her pocket with a mumbled words about their irrelevance. “I didn’t write down anything she said while I was talking to her. That would have been rude. I wrote it down once I got back to my study, and I’m not sure I remembered everything exactly right. However, I do remember her saying, when I suggested that your push-theory is simpler, that she finds it simpler to think that we call punishment good because it is good. If you want to say that we are mistaken it is up to you to explain the mistake.”
With a snicker, Minna answered, “I can hear a student of magic giving that response as a teacher drills him on the four elements. ‘I believe this is the right answer, and it is not up to me to defend my answer as being right. If I believe it, the burden is on you, teacher, to show that it is wrong.’ I don’t think that kind of answer would go very far.”
“There’s a difference between the answer a student gives a master, and an answer which any master gives a student. If all the masters of the world, with few exceptions, believes in the intrinsic value of punishing, and if the answer so permeates a culture that it dominates all public thinking on the issue, then those who believe it have a right to demand some presumption in its favor.”
Jeffers added, “For what it’s worth, I think the Advocate has a point. Existing theories do have a presumption in their favor.”
“On what grounds?” Minna answered, turning to face Jeffers. “If you take the Advocate’s position far enough it says nothing more than that something is true — something exists or does not exists — purely because people believe that it exists. I don’t see that as a criteria of existence.”
“I think people can say the same about Occam’s Razor,” Jeffers answered. “Where is it written that nature must follow the simplest theory? That’s a convention we adopt because we would much rather work with a theory that we find simple than one that is more complicated.”
“Occam’s Razor says more than that we should accept the simplest theory, Jeffers. It says we should not believe in the existence of things which we have no reason to believe in—that we have no evidence for.”
Pierra chimed up, “So, is this Occam’s Razor you talk about a thesis about what exists and what does not, or about what we should believe in the existence of and what we should not?”
Her question stopped Minna and Jeffers for a moment. Jeffers answered first, “I think it has to be an account of what we should believe in, not what exists. It certainly has to be possible for things to exist that do not effect our world in a way we can perceive. It’s possible.”
Minna only shrugged. “I’m not sure it really matters, for all practical purposes. Things that do not effect us or our universe simply do not matter. More to the point, we do have good evidence to show that people believe in an intrinsic value to punishment, and insofar as these beliefs exists the eliminativist must explain them. In that way, I can give some sense to your claim, that a presumption is to be made in favor of society’s beliefs. After all, one good explanation for people’s belief in Justice is that Justice exists. However, in this case, I have an easy explanation for people’s belief in Justice and Will’s Power, though it is not a flattering one.”
The Varlet pushed her chair back and paused through a couple of breaths. “Like I said, the theory that there is a value intrinsic to punishment that pulls us to punish, and a theory that our desire pushes us to punish, stand even at the start. Nothing initially favors one or the other. The push theory, I think, is more coherent with what we know about the differences among individuals—pull theory can account for only by inventing new entities such as ‘moral blindness’ and attributing a ‘sick mind’ to those who do not perceive a value which is out there and independent of us”
Minna shared a private smile with Jeffers as she contributed . “Why believe in a pull theory? Well, if the value is out there and not in me, then it is not for me that people are made to suffer punishment. It’s not to fulfill a desire of mine, but to realize a value out there independent of me. Everybody knows that fulfilling a desire to hurt another cannot, in itself, be good enough to justify punishment. So we ground the fulfillment of our desire on something ‘out there,’ independent of us. It is a rationalization.”
Minna’s voice dropped to a whisper, barely heard across the table. “No doubt, if the desire to rape were as common in humans as the desire to punish, and if women were as rare and, in being so rare, as politically impotent as criminals, society would declare rape to be a duty and choose as its deity one that proclaimed that acts of rape served His divine will.”
Pierra stopped chewing and froze with a filled fork half way to her mouth. Swallowing, she looked first at Jeffers, then back to the Minna. As she lowered her fork back to her plate she asked, “Tell me, Varlet, do you find that our worship of Sif confirms or falsifies this theory of yours?”
Jeffers spoke up. “I’m sorry, Advocate Pierra. I think, as Minna’s confessor, she and I are due for a long talk this evening.”
“I would say,” said Pierra. “I’m glad you said that softly. Your opinions, if these are indeed your opinions, will not credit your testimony when it comes time to address the Council. It even makes me question whether the route I’ve let you lead me down has any merit.”
Minna shook her head, shaking off some stray thought. “You don’t understand. I said what I did only to illustrate a point. People are disposed to favor that theory which grants them what they desire, and a theory which allows them to impose the fulfillment of their wishes on those whose wishes are in conflict is going to appear more attractive than competitors. That, to me, seems too obvious to question. However, I would be the last to assert that people are blind to reason when it illuminates the error in their way of thinking.”
“That’s true,” said Jeffers. “She has insisted all along that, if given a chance to present her side, reason will win in the end.”
Minna had no difficulty hearing the mockery in his words.
Pierra had finished eating and stood to leave. “Remember, you are to meet with Lady Stryklia at fifth bell tomorrow. We’ve already got Matron Deonta and Lady Terrence against us. It will take a miracle to get the other three to vote as a block against them, but that’s what we’re aiming for. You can destroy all hope tomorrow if you do not choose your words carefully.”
With a bow, the Advocate left. Minna did nothing to answer the warning. She watched the Advocate leave, then turned back to finish her meal.
“I’m surprised.” Jeffers said with a whisper. “I must be wearing off on you, you are starting to sound like a true cynic.”